As thought and extension are no longer "parallel," Bergson distinguishes two equally qualitatively differing forms of "common notions": those derived from extension and those expressed in duration.
Configure custom resolver. Se o vemos sob a perspectiva da infinidade de seus modos e mais particularmente nos modos que conhecemos - os modos do pensamento e da extenso -, diremos que ele natura naturada. Da mesma forma que todo modo da extenso se explica por modos da extenso, assim tambm toda idia encontra sua razo em outras idias. Algumas consideraes preliminares so, portanto, indispensveis: 1 Os objetos que o matemtico estuda so objetos reais num certo sentido, pois a linha reta, a circunferncia, a elipse etc. Belo Horizonte.
However, Bergson is unmoved by Spinozism, since he maintains that Rational ordering reflects an artificial accommodation of Mind to Matter, thereby compromising the native Freedom of indeterminate Consciousness. But, in a different context, Bergson implicitly undermines his resistance to Spinoza.
Bergson's system is sometimes classified as Pantheistic, because, like Spinoza's 'natura naturans', his 'Elan Vital' is an immanent creative principle. However, Bergson diverges from Spinoza in holding that Matter is nothing more than degenerated Elan Vital, and, furthermore, that both Spinozistic Extension and Thought are only an arrangement ...
Expanding Horizons: bergson, Spinoza, Rational Ordering
However, Bergson is unmoved by Spinozism, since he maintains that Rational ordering reflects an artificial accommodation of Mind to Matter, thereby compromising the native Freedom of indeterminate Consciousness. But, in a different context, Bergson implicitly undermines his resistance to Spinoza.
According t o this project, Bergson or Spinoza (but the same could be said of Lucretius, Hume, or even Nietzsche) is taken up, read, and interpreted by Deleuze not in order to state clearly what they said t h a t has been ignored or obscured by a bullying tradition of transcendence-such a strategy, Deleuze would be the first to admit, could only ever be one guided by ressentiment-but rather to repeat the gesture by which these Estimated Reading Time: 15 mins.
He also gave courses in Clermont-Ferrand on the Pre-Socratics , in particular on Heraclitus. Lachelier endeavoured "to substitute everywhere force for inertia, life for death, and liberty for fatalism". Compare his memorial address on Ravaisson, who died in There, he read Darwin and gave a course on his theories. In he published his second major work, entitled Matter and Memory. This rather difficult work investigates the function of the brain and undertakes an analysis of perception and memory , leading up to a careful consideration of the problems of the relation of body and mind.
This is especially obvious in Matter and Memory , where he showed a thorough acquaintance with the extensive pathological investigations which had been carried out during the period. This essay on the meaning of comedy stemmed from a lecture which he had given in his early days in the Auvergne.
The study of it is essential to an understanding of Bergson's views of life, and its passages dealing with the place of the artistic in life are valuable. The main thesis of the work is that laughter is a corrective evolved to make social life possible for human beings. We laugh at people who fail to adapt to the demands of society if it seems their failure is akin to an inflexible mechanism.
Comic authors have exploited this human tendency to laugh in various ways, and what is common to them is the idea that the comic consists in there being "something mechanical encrusted on the living". He detailed in this essay his philosophical program, realized in the Creative Evolution.
On the death of Gabriel Tarde , the sociologist and philosopher, in , Bergson succeeded him in the Chair of Modern Philosophy. An illness prevented his visiting Germany from attending the Third Congress held at Heidelberg.
Pierre Imbart de la Tour remarked that Creative Evolution was a milestone of new direction in thought. Following the appearance of this book, Bergson's popularity increased enormously, not only in academic circles but among the general reading public.
At that time, Bergson had already made an extensive study of biology including the theory of fecundation as shown in the first chapter of the Creative Evolution , which had only recently emerged, ca.
Bergson served as a juror with Florence Meyer Blumenthal in awarding the Prix Blumenthal , a grant given between and to painters, sculptors, decorators, engravers, writers, and musicians. Bergson traveled to London in and met there with William James , the Harvard philosopher who was Bergson's senior by seventeen years, and who was instrumental in calling the attention of the Anglo-American public to the work of the French professor.
The two became great friends. James's impression of Bergson is given in his Letters under date of 4 October So modest and unpretending a man but such a genius intellectually! I have the strongest suspicions that the tendency which he has brought to a focus, will end by prevailing, and that the present epoch will be a sort of turning point in the history of philosophy.
As early as , James had contributed an article in French to the periodical La Critique philosophique , of Renouvier and Pillon, entitled Le Sentiment de l'Effort. Four years later, a couple of articles by him appeared in the journal Mind : "What is an Emotion? Bergson quoted the first two of these articles in his work, Time and Free Will. In the following years, —91 appeared the two volumes of James's monumental work, The Principles of Psychology , in which he refers to a pathological phenomenon observed by Bergson.
Some writers, taking merely these dates into consideration and overlooking the fact that James's investigations had been proceeding since registered from time to time by various articles which culminated in "The Principles" , have mistakenly dated Bergson's ideas as earlier than James's. I have been re-reading Bergson's books, and nothing that I have read for years has so excited and stimulated my thoughts. I am sure that his philosophy has a great future; it breaks through old frameworks and brings things to a solution from which new crystallizations can be reached.
He remarks on the encouragement he gained from Bergson's thought, and refers to his confidence in being "able to lean on Bergson's authority. The influence of Bergson had led James "to renounce the intellectualist method and the current notion that logic is an adequate measure of what can or cannot be". It had induced him, he continued, "to give up logic, squarely and irrevocably" as a method, for he found that "reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows, and surrounds it".
These remarks, which appeared in James's book A Pluralistic Universe in , impelled many English and American readers to investigate Bergson's philosophy for themselves, but no English translations of Bergson's major work had yet appeared. James, however, encouraged and assisted Arthur Mitchell in preparing an English translation of Creative Evolution. In August , James died. It was his intention, had he lived to see the translation finished, to introduce it to the English reading public by a prefatory note of appreciation.
In the following year, the translation was completed and still greater interest in Bergson and his work was the result. By coincidence, in that same year , Bergson penned a preface of sixteen pages entitled Truth and Reality for the French translation of James's book, Pragmatism.
In it, he expressed sympathetic appreciation of James's work, together with certain important reservations. From 5 to 11 April, Bergson attended the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy held at Bologna , in Italy, where he gave an address on "Philosophical Intuition".
In response to invitations he visited England in May of that year, and on several subsequent occasions. These visits were well received. His speeches offered new Perspectives and elucidated many passages in his three major works: Time and Free Will , Matter and Memory , and Creative Evolution.
Although necessarily brief statements, they developed and enriched the ideas in his books and clarified for English audiences the fundamental principles of his philosophy.
In May Bergson gave two lectures entitled The Perception of Change La perception du changement at the University of Oxford.
The Clarendon Press published these in French in the same year. Oxford later conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Science. Two days later he delivered the Huxley Lecture at the University of Birmingham , taking for his subject Life and Consciousness. In Bergson visited the United States of America at the invitation of Columbia University , New York, and lectured in several American cities, where very large audiences welcomed him. In February, at Columbia University, he lectured both in French and English, taking as his subjects: Spirituality and Freedom and The Method of Philosophy.
Meanwhile, his popularity increased, and translations of his works began to appear in a number of languages: English, German, Italian, Danish, Swedish, Hungarian, Polish, and Russian. Bergson found disciples of many types. In France movements such as neo-Catholicism and Modernism on the one hand and syndicalism on the other endeavoured to absorb and appropriate for their own ends some central ideas of his teaching. The continental organ of socialist and syndicalist theory, Le Mouvement socialiste ,  portrayed the realism of Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as hostile to all forms of intellectualism, and argued, therefore, that supporters of Marxist socialism should welcome a philosophy such as that of Bergson.
The Roman Catholic Church , however, banned Bergson's three books on the charge of pantheism that is, of conceiving of God as immanent to his Creation and of being himself created in the process of the Creation. In the Scottish universities arranged for Bergson to give the famous Gifford Lectures , planning one course for the spring and another for the autumn.
Bergson delivered the first course, consisting of eleven lectures, under the title of The Problem of Personality , at the University of Edinburgh in the spring of that year.
The course of lectures planned for the autumn months had to be abandoned because of the outbreak of war. Bergson was not, however, silent during the conflict, and he gave some inspiring addresses. Bergson contributed also to the publication arranged by The Daily Telegraph in honour of King Albert I of the Belgians , King Albert's Book Christmas, Meanwhile, he found time to issue at the request of the Minister of Public Instruction a brief summary of French Philosophy.
Bergson did a large amount of traveling and lecturing in America during the war. He participated in the negotiations which led to the entry of the United States in the war. A session was held in January in his honour at which he delivered an address on Ollivier. In the war, Bergson saw the conflict of Mind and Matter, or rather of Life and Mechanism; and thus he shows us the central idea of his own philosophy in action. To no other philosopher has it fallen, during his lifetime, to have his philosophical principles so vividly and so terribly tested.
As many of Bergson's contributions to French periodicals remained relatively inaccessible, he had them published in two volumes. The first of these was being planned when war broke out. The conclusion of strife was marked by the appearance of a delayed volume in The advocate of Bergson's philosophy in England, Wildon Carr , prepared an English translation under the title Mind-Energy.
The volume opens with the Huxley Memorial Lecture of , "Life and Consciousness", in a revised and developed form under the title "Consciousness and Life".
Signs of Bergson's growing interest in social ethics and in the idea of a future life of personal survival are manifested. Other articles are on the False Recognition, on Dreams, and Intellectual Effort. In June , the University of Cambridge honoured him with the degree of Doctor of Letters. Like Bergson's, his writings were placed on the Index by the Vatican. This argument, Merleau-Ponty says, which concerns not the physics of special relativity but its philosophical foundations, addresses paradoxes caused by popular interpretations and misconceptions about the theory, including Einstein's own.
While living with his wife and daughter in a modest house in a quiet street near the Porte d'Auteuil in Paris, Bergson won the Nobel Prize for Literature in for having written The Creative Evolution. He completed his new work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion , which extended his philosophical theories to the realms of morality, religion, and art, in It was respectfully received by the public and the philosophical community, but all by that time realized that Bergson's days as a philosophical luminary were past.
He was, however, able to reiterate his core beliefs near the end of his life, by renouncing all of the posts and honours previously awarded him, rather than accept exemption from the antisemitic laws imposed by the Vichy government. Bergson inclined to convert to Catholicism, writing in his will on 7 February "My thinking has always brought me nearer to Catholicism, in which I saw the perfect complement to Judaism.
After the fall of France in , Jews in occupied France were required to register at police stations. When completing his police form, Bergson made the following entry: "Academic. Nobel Prize winner. On 3 January Bergson died in occupied Paris from bronchitis. A Roman Catholic priest said prayers at his funeral per his request.
Bergson rejected what he saw as the overly mechanistic predominant view of causality as expressed in, say, finalism. He argued that we must allow space for free will to unfold in an autonomous and unpredictable fashion.
While Kant saw free will as something beyond time and space and therefore ultimately a matter of faith, Bergson attempted to redefine the modern conceptions of time, space, and causality in his concept of Duration , making room for a tangible marriage of free will with causality. Seeing Duration as a mobile and fluid concept, Bergson argued that one cannot understand Duration through "immobile" analysis, but only through experiential, first-person intuition.
Bergson considers the appearance of novelty as a result of pure undetermined creation, instead of as the predetermined result of mechanistic forces. His philosophy emphasises pure mobility, unforeseeable novelty, creativity and freedom; thus one can characterize his system as a process philosophy. It touches upon such topics as time and identity, free will , perception, change, memory, consciousness, language, the foundation of mathematics and the limits of reason.
Because of his relative criticism of intelligence, he makes a frequent use of images and metaphors in his writings in order to avoid the use of concepts , which he considers fail to touch the whole of reality, being only a sort of abstract net thrown on things.
For instance, he says in The Creative Evolution chap. III that thought in itself would never have thought it possible for the human being to swim, as it cannot deduce swimming from walking. For swimming to be possible, man must throw itself in water, and only then can thought consider swimming as possible. Intelligence, for Bergson, is a practical faculty rather than a pure speculative faculty, a product of evolution used by man to survive.
If metaphysics is to avoid "false problems", it should not extend the abstract concepts of intelligence to pure speculation, but rather use intuition. The Creative Evolution in particular attempted to think through the continuous creation of life, and explicitly pitted itself against Herbert Spencer 's evolutionary philosophy. Spencer had attempted to transpose Charles Darwin 's theory of evolution in philosophy and to construct a cosmology based on this theory Spencer also coined the expression " survival of the fittest ".
Bergson disputed what he saw as Spencer's mechanistic philosophy. Bergson's Lebensphilosophie philosophy of life can be seen as a response to the mechanistic philosophies of his time,  but also to the failure of finalism. Bergson regarded planning beforehand for the future as impossible, since time itself unravels unforeseen possibilities. Indeed, one could always explain a historical event retrospectively by its conditions of possibility.
In his words, the effect created its cause. The foundation of Henri Bergson's philosophy, his theory of Duration , he discovered when trying to improve the inadequacies of Herbert Spencer 's philosophy.
Kant believed that free will better perceived as The Will could only exist outside of time and space, indeed the only non-determined aspect of our private existence in the universe, separate to water cycles, mathematics and mortality.
However, we could therefore not know whether or not it exists, and that it is nothing but a pragmatic faith. Based on this he concluded that determinism is an impossibility and free will pure mobility, which is what Bergson identified as being the Duration. Duration, as defined by Bergson, then is a unity and a multiplicity, but, being mobile, it cannot be grasped through immobile concepts. Bergson hence argues that one can grasp it only through his method of intuition.
Two images from Henri Bergson's An Introduction to Metaphysics may help one to grasp Bergson's term intuition, the limits of concepts, and the ability of intuition to grasp the absolute. The first image is that of a city. Analysis, or the creation of concepts through the divisions of points of view, can only ever give us a model of the city through a construction of photographs taken from every possible point of view, yet it can never give us the dimensional value of walking in the city itself.
One can only grasp this through intuition; likewise the experience of reading a line of Homer. One may translate the line and pile commentary upon commentary, but this commentary too shall never grasp the simple dimensional value of experiencing the poem in its originality itself.
The method of intuition, then, is that of getting back to the things themselves. This concept led several authors to characterize Bergson as a supporter of vitalism —although he criticized it explicitly in The Creative Evolution , as he thought, against Driesch and Johannes Reinke whom he cited that there is neither "purely internal finality nor clearly cut individuality in nature": .
Hereby lies the stumbling block of vitalist theories It is thus in vain that one pretends to reduce finality to the individuality of the living being. If there is finality in the world of life, it encompasses the whole of life in one indivisible embrace. In Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic , Bergson develops a theory not of laughter itself but of how laughter can be provoked see his objection to Delage, published in the 23rd edition of the essay.
From his first publications, Bergson's philosophy attracted strong criticism from different quarters, although he also became very popular and durably influenced French philosophy. But he did not have the equivalent of graduate students who might have become rigorous interpreters of his thought.
Thus Bergson's philosophy—in principle open and nonsystematic—was easily borrowed piecemeal and altered by enthusiastic admirers". Alfred North Whitehead acknowledged Bergson's influence on his process philosophy in his Process and Reality. Although acknowledging Bergson's literary skills, Russell saw Bergson's arguments at best as persuasive or emotive speculation but not at all as any worthwhile example of sound reasoning or philosophical insight.
Many writers of the early 20th century criticized Bergson's intuitionism , indeterminism, psychologism and interpretation of the scientific impulse. Those who explicitly criticized Bergson, either in published articles or in letters, included Bertrand Russell  George Santayana ,  G. Moore , Ludwig Wittgenstein , Martin Heidegger ,  Julien Benda ,  T.
Adorno ,  Lucio Colletti ,  Jean-Paul Sartre ,  and Georges Politzer ,  as well as Maurice Blanchot ,  American philosophers such as Irving Babbitt , Arthur Lovejoy , Josiah Royce , The New Realists Ralph B.
Perry , E. Sellars , C. Strong, and A. Rogers , Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler , Roger Fry see his letters , Julian Huxley in Evolution: The Modern Synthesis and Virginia Woolf for the latter, see Ann Banfield , The Phantom Table. The Vatican accused Bergson of pantheism , while others have characterized his philosophy as a materialist emergentism — Samuel Alexander and C.
Lloyd Morgan explicitly claimed Bergson as their forebear. Hude alleges that a mystical experience , roughly outlined at the end of Les Deux sources de la morale et de la religion , is the inner principle of his whole philosophy, although this has been contested by other commentators. Charles Sanders Peirce took strong exception to those who associated him with Bergson. See, for example, Horace Kallen 's book on the subject James and Bergson.
As Jean Wahl described the "ultimate disagreement" between James and Bergson in his System of Metaphysics : "for James, the consideration of action is necessary for the definition of truth, according to Bergson, action Gide even went so far as to say that future historians will overestimate Bergson's influence on art and philosophy just because he was the self-appointed spokesman for "the spirit of the age". As early as the s, Santayana attacked certain key concepts in Bergson's philosophy, above all his view of the New and the indeterminate:.
This is no great renunciation; for that consummation of science According to Santayana and Russell, Bergson projected false claims onto the aspirations of scientific method, claims which Bergson needed to make in order to justify his prior moral commitment to freedom. Russell takes particular exception to Bergson's understanding of number in chapter two of Time and Free-will.
According to Russell, Bergson uses an outmoded spatial metaphor "extended images" to describe the nature of mathematics as well as logic in general. This is not only because Deleuze wrote about Bergson; it is also because Deleuze's own thought is deeply engaged with that of his predecessor, even when Bergson is not explicitly mentioned. Thus Bergson became a resource in the criticism of the Hegelian dialectic , the negative. He writes that despite the philosopher and his philosophy being very popular during the early years of the twentieth century, his ideas had been critiqued and then rejected first by phenomenology , then by existentialism , and finally by post-structuralism.
Japanese philosopher Yasushi Hirai from Fukuoka University has led a collaborative and interdisciplinary project from , bringing together Eastern and Western philosophers and scientists to discuss and promote Bergson's work. Several Hindu authors have found parallels to Hindu philosophy in Bergson's thought.
Finally, i n t h e concluding section, Bergson considers the place of knowing within nature, the relation of the individual soul to Nature whose character determines the quality of the soul. In short, one understands through a n immediate or absolute synthesis t h a t does not justify or rely upon a prior analysis.
The immediate consequence of t h e postulation of this essential knowledge t h a t is distinct from both synthetic and analytic knowledge generally is that the relation between the definition and its consequent theorems is no longer causal in the tradi- tional sense. The order elaborated by the theorems is conceived by Spinoza as implicit, or immanent within t h e definition. It is coupled with this double postulate: the number of things is infinite; they are in universal connection.
This is the postulate of the The essential knowledge found i n mathematical thinking, with i t s immediate dual aspect, finds its application to worldly knowledge in the dual z aspect of the systematic character of the world. Spinoza, however, taking his cue from t h e immediate reciprocity of analysis and synthesis in mathematical thought, develops his idea of essential knowledge through a prioritization of t h e concern for order that marks both analysis and synthesis.
The moments or aspects of analysis and synthesis a r e thought together in the essential knowledge of the order of the world: this comprises the transposition of the thinking individual into God or Substance or Nature. The existence of Substance is in fact indicated by t h e order t h a t organizes and unites t h e analytic and synthetic aspects of finite knowledge. This does not mean, however, t h a t the existence and char- acter of Substance is proven by the existence and character of finite knowledge.
On the contrary, finite knowledge is shown to consist of a limitation of the order that connects distinct things. This is precisely t h e n a t u r e of t h e dual, synthetidanalytic character of finite thinking.
There is no sense of contingency or possibility in t h i s causation because there is nothing t h a t produces the expression other than the essence of the thing. For Bergson, both courses of thought are united by a concern for freedom and i t is this concept t h a t governs his reading of the Fifth Book of the Ethics.
It is one: one g r a s p s it by a simple intuition of t h e mind. Now imagine a n indefinite number of circumferences drawn upon a piece of paper or a chalkboard. Their number is infinite, each one of them is infinitely divisible, and nevertheless they a r e all contained i n t h a t simple, indivisible law by virtue of which one creates t h e circumference.
T h i s simple law i s comparable to t h e divine attribute of extension, and t h e extension t h a t we know-illusory extension, infinitely divisible-corresponds to t h a t infinite zyxwv multitude of real and infinitely divisible circumferences t h a t are merely the multiple equivalent of t h a t one and indivisible law.
Synthesis and analysis are both methods of thinking proper to finite thought. Or, finally, the two possibilities of finite thinking are determined by a n absolute, nonconditioned freedom. Bergson expresses this absolute freedom negatively through recourse to another mathematical example: parallel lines.
There is no limit to t h e number of mathematical descriptions of parallel lines, nor is there a limit to their relative complexity.
On t h e other hand, essential freedom, the freedom of God, is analogous to a mathematical elaboration of the definition of parallel lines that is exhaustive a n d absolute i n itself without any additive interruptions. This expression cannot itself be discovered by the finite operations of a scientifically inclined finite thought because i t s simplicity makes possible the additive composition of such a thought.
What is a mode? Since Substance is expressed infinitely in the order of every attribute, each mode of every attribute corresponds t o a mode of every other attribute. In this way Spinoza can claim that the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas. The parallel series of modes in the attributes of thought and extension compel the philosopher who takes the route of thinking natura naturata to investigate the human being as the conjunction of these series.
A human being is the principle of the order that, according t o extension, organizes the human body and, according t o thought, organizes human thinking. This failure is not characteristic of the idea but rather indicates t h a t the thinking soul t h a t conceives i t has not adequately discerned the order that binds this idea t o others according to a principle.
A passion in fact limits the activity of a soul insofar as it prevents that soul from incorporating the relevant idea into the substantial or essential order of ideas. The inadequate idea is a n inhibition of the essential order of the soul and, consequently, an inhibition of the internal necessity of substance that constitutes freedom.
Passions therefore limit or impede the power of the soul, its connection with other bodies and ideas in the essential order, while adequate ideas increase this power by integrating the soul with other bodies and ideas. Whether it begins with natura naturans or natura naturata, philosophical thought does not a t t a i n to a truthful conclusion so much as constitute, in its zyxw activity, a n increase i n human power and human joy.
And, finally, it is i n philosophical thinking t h a t human thinking becomes absolutely free. The essential argument of Time and Free Will is that living or flowing time is radically different from-and hence irredu- cible to-space.
This discussion of freedom is itself the second half of the chapter and follows a discussion of determinism in the natural world as well as in psychological accounts of the human mind. Bergson faults both zyxw physical and psychological determinism insofar a s they offer accounts of temporal phenomena that unquestioningly transfer t h e language used to describe completed actions either actions actually completed or actions conceived from a stand- point from which they are taken as completed to the present, living actions of a free will.
Freedom is not absolute for Bergson; it is a matter of degrees. Both accounts fail, according t o Bergson, because z the notion of causality that underlies each of them eliminates the distinctive liveliness of freedom. By analyzing the concept of cause, we shall show the ambiguity which it involves, and, though not aiming at a formal definition of freedom, we shall perhaps get beyond the purely negative idea of it which we have framed up to the present.
This prefiguring can be thought through in one of two ways according to Bergson. On t h e one hand, causality may be thought mathematically by determining the real succession of particular events to be the expression of ideal mathematical laws. On t h e other hand, causality may be thought of as t h e determination of an event by a prior event achieved through the actualization of a possibility, not according to mathematical necessity. Mosse-Bastide reduces this interest to two primary reasons.
This demise was the result of a multi-valenced dissatisfaction with the perceived totalization of the Hegelian system.
Where Bergson had used Kant in order to work out of the impasses of z Spinozistic or Leibnizian determinism, i t was now Bergson, together with Spinoza, that offered the resources for thinking in a non-Hegelian way. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy New York: Routledge, , Joe Sachs [Sante Fe: Green Lion Press, a s well as t h e Metaphysics esp.
Joe Sachs Sante Fe: Green Lion Press, ; for Aquinas on t h e intellect, s e e O n T r u t h , book 1, articles , i n Selected Philosophical W r i t i n g s , trans. Timothy S. McDermott Oxford: Oxford University Press, , J o h n Mullarkey [Manchester: Manchester University Press, , M a r k L e s t e r w i t h Charles Stivale New York: Columbia University Press, , and Hugh Tomlinson a n d Barbara Habberjam [New York: Zone Books, ], Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, t r a n s.
Martin Joughin New York: Zone Books, , Paul Patton New York: Columbia University Press, Leibniz and Clarke: Correspondence, ed. Ariew Indianapolis: Hackett, H e n r i H u d e Paris: P r e s s e s Universitaires d e France, , Samuel Shirley Indianapolis: Hackett, , esp. Appendix to Ethics I, E2P7, and E2P13S the so-called Physical Digression. Note t h a t for Bergson, as opposed to Kant, analysis is creative.
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, , Henri Bergson, Oeuvres Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, , Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol.
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, a n d Dugald Murdoch Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, , Henri Hude and Jean-Louis Dumas [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, , In that book, Spinoza is seen a s the natural outcome of t h e Cartesian tradition of physics t h a t regards all interaction a s mechanical.
Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: A n Essay on the zyxwv I m m e d i a t e D a t a of Consciousness, t r a n s. Pogson Montana: Kessinger Publishing Company, date unavailable , ch. Spinoza provides a discussion of the four ways of knowing i n his Treatise on the Emendation o f the Intellect, in Spinoza: Complete Works, See also E2P40S2. ZZZ,
Henri Bergson - Wikipedia
Henri-Louis Bergson (French: ; 18 October 1859 – 4 January 1941) was a French philosopher who was influential in the tradition of continental philosophy, especially during the first half of the 20th century until the Second World War. Bergson is known for his …
However, Bergson is unmoved by Spinozism, since he maintains that Rational ordering reflects an artificial accommodation of Mind to Matter, thereby compromising the native Freedom of indeterminate Consciousness. But, in a different context, Bergson implicitly undermines his resistance to Spinoza. Richard A. Cohen, in his essay entitled ‘Philo, Spinoza, Bergson: The Rise of an Ecological points out that Bergson marks a turning point in Western intellectual history. He adopts historian Harry Austryn Wolfson's periodization of Western history, who divides it . The of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza. Alexandre Lefebvre. AVAILABLE FROM STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS The of Law Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza Alexandre Lefebvre pp. from $ wixel.be?id= Also view online: PREFACE TABLE OF CONTENTS The of Law is the rst book to examine law Estimated Reading Time: 6 mins.
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